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Abstract
In spite of all no-go theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and
Specker,..., Bell,...) we constructed a realist basis of quantum me-
chanics. In our model both classical and quantum spaces b are rough
images of the fundamental prespace. Quantum mechanics cannot be
reduced to classical one. Both classical and quantum representations
induce reductions of prespace information.
1. Introduction. In preprints [1] 1 there was constructed a contextual
quantum representation of the Kolmogorovian model. That mathematical
construction can be used as a realist basis of quantum mechanics (QM).
Existence of such a realist “underground” of QM was the question of the
great debate since first days of QM, see, e.g., [2], [3] for detail. It should
be reminded that A. Einstein strongly supported the idea that such a realist
underground of QM could finally be found and W. Heisenberg and N. Bohr
claimed that it would be impossible. In this note we present main ideas
of [1] without to go in rather technical mathematical details of contextual
representation of the Kolmogorovian model in a Hilbert space.
It should be underlined from the very beginning that we do not discuss
a reduction of quantum physics to classical one.
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2. Prespace, classical space and quantum space. In my model
both quantum and classical states are rough images of contexts – complexes
of physical conditions. In the mathematical model [1], cf. [4], contexts are
described as sets of fundamental parameters. We call the space of fundamen-
tal parameters prespace and denote it Ω. Contexts are representated by a
family of subsets of Ω. The prespace Ω is underground of the classical space
Xcl = R
3 as well as the quantum (Hilbert) space Xq = H. QM gives essen-
tially richer picture of the prespace Ω : the QM-representation of Ω-contexts
generates essentially larger class of images than the classical representation.
In particular, it is impossible to reduce quantum picture of the prespace Ω
to the classical one.
This is a very delicate point of considerations. Dynamics in the prespace
Ω is a deterministic dynamics. But it is not “classical dynamics” since the
latter takes place not in the prespace Ω but in the classical space Xcl. This
is not a question of the mathematical realization of the prespace Ω and the
classical space Xcl. It may be that the prespace Ω can also be described
as Ω = Rm (or even as Ω = R3 – so in the same way as Xcl = R
3, cf.
section 8). The crucial point is that Xcl is created via the huge reduction
of information in the process of transition from the prespace contexts to
points of Xcl. Each classical point x ∈ Xcl is the image of a domain Bx of the
prespace Ω, see [1], and this domain can contain huge (may be even infinite)
number of prepoints ω = ωx. By our model there exist mappings:
Ω→ Xcl, Ω→ Xq, and Xq → Xcl
Thus we also obtain the map:
Ω→ Xq → Xcl
But there is no pathway:
Ω→ Xcl → Xq
We underline (see further considerations) that the correspondence principle
is based on the map Ω→ Xq and not at all on the map Xq → Xcl.
3. Fundamental incompatible preobservables. Contextual proba-
bilistic representation [1] of Ω-contexts in the quantum spaceXq = H is based
on a fixed pair of incompatible preobservables (reference observables):
b, a : Ω→ R (1)
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In our model [1] preobservables are functions d : Ω → R. Denote the set
of all preobservables O(Ω). We interpret observables d ∈ O(Ω) as realist
observables: by fixing a prepoint ω ∈ Ω we are able to fix the value d =
d(ω). We are not able to measure an arbitrary d ∈ O(Ω). But reference
preobservables (1) and functions of those preobservables, f(b), f(a) can be
measured [1]. We denote the space of quantum observables by the symbol
O(H). In mathematical models O(Ω) and O(H) are represented by spaces of
(Kolmogorovian) random variables and self-adjoint operators, respectively.
4. Position-momentum picture of prespace. In principle a con-
textual probabilistic representation of the prespace Ω in the quantum space
Xq = H can be based on any pair of incompatible preobservables. However,
it seems that we (human beings) can use only the special pair of reference
preobservables:
(q, p) = (position,momentum).
Thus modern quantum as well as classical physics are the position-momentum
pictures of the prespace. All classical and quantum observables are functions
of position and momentum observables. In quantum case we use functions
dˆ = u(qˆ, pˆ) of operators of the position qˆ and the momentum pˆ.
By choosing another pair of reference preobservables we obtain another
quantum picture of the prespace Ω. However, it seems that at the present
time we are not able to measure preobservables d ∈ O(Ω) distinct from
functions f(q) and g(p).
5. Nonequivalence of quantum pictures of the prespace. It should
be underlined that quantum pictures of the prespace Ω based on two different
pairs of incompatible observables (b, a) and (v, w) are in general nonequiva-
lent. Of course, the same mathematical formalism – the Hilbert space for-
malism – can be used for any quantum picture of the Ω.2 But we should
pay attention to physical structures of representations. So we should not
forget about the (q, p)-origin of QM (as a physical theory and not as only a
mathematical formalism), see also [5], [6].
6. No “no-go?” Existence of a realist underground model of QM looks
very surprising in the view of various no-go theorems, e.g., von Neumann
[7], Kochen-Specker [8], Bell [9],... But all those no-go theorems suffered of
the absence of physical justification for the list of assumptions on the corre-
spondence between a realist prequantum model and QM. J. Bell performed
2But Hilbert spacesHb/a and Hv/w corresponding to pictures based on (b, a) and (v, w)
can be different.
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the brilliant analysis of assumptions on the “real-quantum” correspondence
which were assumed (very often indirectly) in previous no-go theorems, see
[9]. We should agree with Bell that von Neumann, Kochen and Specker and
many others wanted too much for the “real-quantum” correspondence. Thus
despite all pre-Bellian no-go theorems J. Bell was sure that it is possible to
construct a realist basis of QM. However, J. Bell also wanted too much for
the “real-quantum” correspondence, see,e.g., [10], [6] for analysis of Bell’s
assumptions. As a consequence, he came to the conclusion that every realist
prequantum model should be nonlocal.
7. Correspondence between preobservables and quantum ob-
servables. Correspondence-maps
W : O(Ω)→ O(H)
between realist preobservables and quantum observables which were consid-
ered by von Neumann, Kochen and Specker, ..., Bell,... were too straight-
forward. Neither von Neumann and Kochen-Specker nor Bell had physical
arguments to present a list of “natural features” of such a correspondence
W. I neither have physical arguments. But I have strong probabilistic argu-
ments. There exists a unique quantum representation of a Kolmogorovian
model and this representation automatically induces a map W which have
very special properties [1]. Neither von Neumann and Kochen-Specker nor
Bell maps have such properties.
In our realist model the map W is defined only on a proper domain DW
in O(Ω), namely
DW = O(b, a) = {d(ω) = f(b(ω)) + g(a(ω))},
where (b, a) is the pair of reference preobservables determining the quantum
picture of the Ω. And in general the map W does not preserve conditional
probability distributions. Here we consider two conditionings: contextual
conditioning in the Ω and quantum state coditioning in the H.
But (!) conditional averages are preserved by the map W :
E(d/C) = (dˆφC, φC),
where dˆ =W (d), d ∈ DW , and φC ∈ H is the image of a prespace context C.
It is very important that quantum Hamiltonians belong to the W -image
of the set of preobservables. The operator
Hˆ =
aˆ2
2
+ V (bˆ)
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is the image of the energy preobservable
H(ω) =
a(ω)2
2
+ V (b(ω)).
But as we have already underlined the W does not preserve probability dis-
tributions. So Hˆ and H(ω) have different probability distributions. But they
have the same average.
8. Quantization and the correspondence principle. As we noticed,
it was proved [1] that quantum Hamiltonian Hˆ has the same contextual
average as the prespace Hamiltonian H :
E(H/C) = (HˆφC , φC). (2)
We can speculate that this coincidence of averages is the real basis of quanti-
zation rules. By (2) to obtain the correct average of the energy preobservable
H(ω) we should put quantum images of the reference preobservables into the
prespace Hamiltonian:
b→ bˆ =W (b), a→ aˆ =W (a) (3)
and, in particular, for the (position, momentum) quantization
qΩ → qˆ =W (qΩ), pΩ → pˆ = W (qΩ) (4)
We should sharply distinguish the prespace position and momentum,
qΩ, pΩ, and classical space position and momentum qXcl , pXcl. In our model
(in the opposite to the very common opinion) qˆ 6= W (qXcl) and pˆ 6= W (pXcl).
By our model the root of the quantization rule is the equality (2) and
Hamiltonian dynamics in the prespace Ω and not Hamiltonian dynamics in
the classical space Xcl.
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Conclusion. In spite of all no-go theorems the realist model of QM
exists.
I would like to thank A. Plotnitsky for numerous discussions on Heisenberg-
Bohr interpretation of QM and L. Accardi, L. Ballentine, S. Gudder for dis-
cussions on the role of conditional probabilities in QM which were extremely
3It may be that dynamics in Ω and Xcl are mathematically described in the same
way. But we should distinguish Hamiltonian prespace dynamics and classical Hamiltonian
dynamics.
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important for the creation of a contextual representation of a Kolmogorovian
model in a Hilbert space [1], cf. [4].
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